Article

‘Who Controls the Past Controls the Future: Who Controls the Present Controls the Past’

Nostalgia as a Phenomenon in Dystopian Novels

Asami Nakamura

The twentieth century began with a futuristic utopia and ended with nostalgia.

Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia

Associating dystopian fiction with nostalgia might seem counterintuitive; the former is typically an account of the future, whereas the latter is considered a longing for the past. They share, however, something in common—namely a sense of disillusionment with the present. When nostalgia is felt intensely, it could be assumed that there is a need to recollect one’s past for the purpose of reaffirming and consolidating one’s identity in a present situation. Meanwhile, although antique collectors and enthusiasts of ancient times might be considered purveyors of nostalgia, they are not necessarily anti-present. It is nonetheless worth questioning why these enthusiasts favour past objects over those that are produced in the present.

Although nostalgia has been discussed in studies of dystopian fiction, rarely is it focused on as a concept requiring thorough analysis. In this paper, I argue that nostalgia is characteristic of dystopian fiction both implicitly and explicitly. In order to capture a full understanding of this topic, I will first establish a theoretical framework. Drawing on Jeff Malpas’s conceptualisation
of nostalgia as a mood or a phenomenon, which encompasses self and world, I
will attempt to look beyond the distinction between ‘positive nostalgia’ and
‘negative nostalgia’. I will then analyse various representations of nostalgia in
the following dystopian novels: Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) by George Orwell,
The Handmaid’s Tale (1985) by Margaret Atwood and Never Let Me Go (2005) by
Kazuo Ishiguro. These texts have been chosen not only because nostalgia is a
central theme of each, but also because when examined together, it becomes
possible to see how the theme has been dealt with over time, from the mid-
twentieth century to the early twenty-first century.

I. The Concept of Nostalgia

Regarding the origin of nostalgia, Jeff Malpas points out that ‘the experience of
loss and estrangement that lies at its heart is ancient’. Classical works such as
the writings of Homer, Ovid and Seneca, as well as later works like Robert
Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy (1621) offer notable meditations on nostalgia,
yet it wasn’t until the late seventeenth century that the term ‘nostalgia’ was
created. The word itself is a compound of two Greek words, ‘one of which is
Nosos, return to the native land; the other, Algos, signifies suffering or grief’. It
was coined by Johannes Hofer in his 1688 dissertation entitled ‘Medical
Disseration on Nostalgia or Homesickness’ to define a disease caused by ‘the
sad mood originating from the desire for the return to one’s native land’. Here,
nostalgia is equivalent to homesickness, manifested by various symptoms
prevalent among ‘certain youths’, and apparently impossible to be cured ‘unless
they had been brought back to their native land’. Hofer draws on a few case
studies: Swiss mercenaries (‘the centurions of the forces in Helvetian Gaul’), a
male student from Berne studying in Basel, and ‘a certain country girl’. All
three are claimed to be dying patients, which indicates the apparent lethal
nature of nostalgia. The feeling of nostalgia can be conjured up by things which
might seem quite trivial to others, yet these feelings can develop
into a certain
mood which persists and dominates the subject, leading to a state of
melancholy. At the same time, the sense of alienation prevents the subject from
adapting to the current circumstance, causing feelings of bitterness. In a sense,
their environment becomes a prison.

In these cases, the object of nostalgia appears to be obvious; it is one’s
home or place where one grew up, or on a broader scale, one’s homeland/country. It is, however, important to note that home cannot be
reduced to a mere location; numerous elements, such as family, foods, customs
and personal events comprise one’s home, although it would still be inaccurate
to claim that home is reducible to these elements alone. Each of them serves to
help construct one’s sense of identity, that is, one’s feelings of belonging to
their home. It should be noted, nevertheless, that the main focus in Hofer’s
dissertation is the spatial aspect of home – home as a specific place which exists
or existed in one’s lifetime. His emphasis on physically returning home as a
cure for the disease makes this clear. Meanwhile, over the course of history, the
concept of home appears to have had a paradigm shift; where it is
predominantly spatial in Hofer’s examples listed above, it has since gained a
more temporal character. Tammy Clewell summarises this as follows:

By the eighteenth century, when nostalgia ceased to be regarded in
pathological terms, it assumed a temporal form. Nostalgia came to
name not a bodily disease generated by missing a place but rather an
emotional longing for lost time, a phenomenon that Romantic poets so
famously figured as a sense of wonder, of unlimited possibilities, or even of immortality associated with childhood and youth.11

The concept of home is both spatial and temporal in its nature, yet what should be noted with regard to nostalgia’s shift in meaning is the spatialisation of time. To illustrate: if time A, as childhood, and time B, as the present are here considered as two places, and the duration of time between them amounts to a distance, it goes without saying that returning to one’s past, or specifically childhood in a physical sense is simply impossible.12 Even the time machine would not be able to solve this conundrum, since the image of one’s past is always subject to one’s current situation, and there is no guarantee that one could find that exact image in the past where one had arrived via the time machine. Edward S. Casey clarifies this point by emphasising the nature of memories as (at least partially) imagined from a perspective of the present: nostalgia is a phenomenon of ‘being moved into a past world that existed by grace of productive imagination and its resonance in the present’.13 A past time is then only accessible in the form of memories associated with it. However, this also indicates that a past time, childhood, for example, is not absolutely lost; what is lost is the possibility of repeating a certain time in the past.

Nevertheless, it would be misleading to theorise that nostalgia is now primarily a temporal concept despite being commonly treated as such. With regard to this, Jeff Malpas argues that home is first and foremost a place, and the distinction between the spatial and the temporal is only useful in investigating the historical shift in the emphasis of the notion of home: ‘[u]nderstood precisely as a pain associated with desire for home – and as home is neither a space nor a time, but a place that holds a space and time within it – so nostalgia can never be understood as spatial or temporal alone’.14 Malpas’s conception of home is based on Heidegger’s formulation of place and space. According to Heidegger, space is ‘neither an external object nor an inner experience’.15 As suggested by his term ‘being-in-the-world’, one’s existence cannot be understood ontologically if the self and the world are categorised as two distinct entities. A space is rather a realm of possibilities generated by a ‘boundary’:

What the word for space, Raum, Rum, designates is said by its ancient meaning. Raum means a place cleared or freed for settlement and lodging. A space is something that has been made room for, something that is cleared and free, namely within a boundary […]. A boundary is not that at which something stops but […] the boundary is that from which something begins its presencing. […] Accordingly, spaces receive their being from locations and not from “space”.16

Heidegger rejects an abstract conception of space, and postulates that place is not a mere sub-category of space. Meanwhile, home is not a specific container, which preserves our past memories. Heidegger defines home as ‘the circumference that is historically enclosed and nourishing, that fuels all courage and releases all capacities, that surrounds the place where humans belong in the essential meaning of a claimed listening’.17 The ‘place’ in this quotation can be considered as a space that emerges within a boundary or a circumference, which is enacted by locations. Moreover, to ‘listen’ is to be ‘addressed’ and ‘claimed’ by ‘that in which they belong’.18 It could be thus posited that home is where one recognises oneself as a historical presence by being called into such realisation. This conceptualisation of home is more comprehensive than merely suggesting that home is neither a spatial point of
reference nor a container of a certain period of the past, in that it allows the exploration of the theoretical potential of home as a mooring of one’s existence.

Malpas’s criticism of Svetlana Boym’s conception of home should be touched on here. Malpas argues that Boym expands the definition of home too far. In her work on nostalgia, Boym differentiates two ‘tendencies’ of nostalgia or attitudes towards memorabilia: one is ‘restorative nostalgia’ and the other ‘reflective nostalgia’. In ‘restorative nostalgia’, home can be a place or time to which the subject has never been (say, a particular historical period). Malpas points out that ‘restorative nostalgia’ ‘not only lacks any sense of pain, of algos, but strictly speaking also lacks any proper sense of home, of nostos, since it lacks any sense that what is at issue is what already belongs to it. Malpas names this pseudo-nostalgia as ‘mythophilia’—‘a longing not for what is remembered, but for what is known only through its retelling, through story and myth’. The fact that appropriating a past as his or her own and mourning for its loss, or claiming to belong to an imaginary place in some spiritual manner is associated with nostalgia only reveals the close relationship between imagination and memory. Although this paper does not delve into this binary opposition between imagination and memory (nor the relationship between nostalgia and nationalism), Malpas’s distinction of nostalgia and mythophilia is nevertheless worthy of attention in that it serves to limit the focus of nostalgia, considering the fact that the term tends to be used rather casually even in academic contexts.

As mentioned above, the temporal aspect of the concept of nostalgia has been more highlighted than the spatial aspect, although this imbalance becomes problematic, as it makes nostalgia a target of criticism in terms of authentic historical perception. Malpas acknowledges this by stating that such nostalgia ‘[entails] a denial of or blindness to the present, and [is] therefore inevitably given over to conservatism and self-delusion’. Nostalgia in this case indicates an unreflective attitude towards a period or an era one wantonly mythologises, where cognitive brackets are conveniently put around anything negative to one’s desire. In his paper on the genealogy of nostalgia as a critical term, Nauman Naqvi indicates that from around 1980, critics began to add a predominantly negative connotation to such an act of selective memory: ‘“[n]ostalgia” as a critical category is usually employed to target the valorisation and manipulation of the past that is a feature of a range of exclusionary and oppressive political projects’. It is such a supposition where nostalgia is used as ‘a term of critical opprobrium’ in the field of humanities. Nostalgia has since often been labelled as regressive, reactionary and thus unable to accommodate any critical perspective against the status quo in order to open up radical potential of the future. It is a mood, which should be avoided – at least on the level of consciousness.

In opposition to such negative employment of the term nostalgia, several attempts to redeem the concept have been made. Raffaella Baccolini’s ‘critical nostalgia’ is one such attempt, which resonates with Boym’s ‘reflective nostalgia’. Being critically nostalgic is ‘a re-visionist approach’, that is, ‘to look at the past critically and to yearn for a different past, now, and to desire a different future’. Rather than attempting to obtain an authentic image of history, it is to imagine what history could have done to facilitate the discovery of ignored possibilities. Yet it should be noted that Baccolini’s argument operates on the dichotomy of ‘regressive nostalgia’ and ‘critical nostalgia’. An issue underlying this categorisation, along with Boym’s ‘restorative nostalgia’ and ‘reflective nostalgia’, is its detached attitude towards the world, which is founded on the dichotomy of the self, and the world. Boym discredits the sense
of belonging since it leads one to believe in a single, particular home: ‘Nostalgia is paradoxical in the sense that longing can make us more empathetic toward fellow humans, yet the moment we try to repair longing with belonging, the apprehension of loss with a rediscovery of identity, we often part ways and put an end to mutual understanding’.  

Boym’s assumption here is that this attachment to or obsession with one’s home can easily degenerate into parochialism and xenophobia, which would consequently hinder mutual understanding with others; hence if there is still some space for nostalgia to be affirmed in terms of ethics, it should be limited to the critical sphere. In Boym’s model, an object affects the subject in a certain manner by reminding them of their past. Here presumably, the subject can choose either to wallow in fantasy or take a critical distance from it.

This view, however, overlooks the fact that nostalgia is first and foremost a mood where in its nature, self and world are tangled up together. Malpas underscores this aspect as follows:

[N]ostalgia is a certain mode of appearing of both self and world […] Moods always involve […] a common ‘tuning’ (as the German term suggests) of self and world, so that a mood is no mere internal feeling but is always also externalised.

This dual modality of mood avoids the dichotomy of the self and the world, the strategy which Heidegger employs in his philosophy: ‘[h]aving a mood is not related to the psychical in the first instance, and is not itself an inner condition which then reaches forth in an enigmatical way and puts its mark on Things and persons’. In focusing on the critical aspect of nostalgia, Boym underestimates the nature of nostalgia as a mood, which cannot be sufficiently investigated by way of her predominantly political take on the concept. This is not to claim that the element of ‘choice’ is completely absent when it comes to nostalgia as a mood; indeed, it is farfetched to conclude that one is completely at the mercy of one’s own mood. However, the issue here is that the ‘critical’ type of nostalgia advocated by Boym and others, remains as free-floating scepticism, failing to examine a deeper dimension beneath the feeling of homelessness or the loss of orientation in the world. To grasp its conceptual implications fully, rather than view it as an attitude, it is necessary to look at it as a phenomenon, which would reveal one’s perception of the temporal and the spatial, and to explore the concept of home through nostalgia.

2. Nostalgia in Dystopian Novels

In discussing the narrative tendency of classical dystopian novels, Chris Ferns points out that ‘the past, in its turn, becomes the main source of the values in comparison with which dystopian society is judged and found wanting.’ For instance, in Brave New World, the Controller declares ‘history is bunk’; this indeed illustrates a typical attitude towards the past in hegemonic discourses in dystopias. By claiming the end of history, authorities strive to fabricate the past and negate the future in order to boast the supremacy of the present. The past is an antagonistic force to the current state and has to be supressed through measures such as book burning, imposing new customs and media control. In this context, nostalgia is considered subversive by authority in that it presupposes individual/collective longings and memories that could run counter to the absoluteness of the pseudo-utopian state. The past is an enemy of the state; a desire for the past results in punishment, often culminating in death. The protagonists in these dystopian novels cannot help but engage in
nostalgia as a means to counter authority and/or to replenish their own subjectivity with personal memories, which were removed to serve collective ideology.

‘Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past’. In this dictum in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, the past is the object of control; failing to control it by not following the Party’s order indicates a lack of ‘self-discipline’.34 Nostalgia is thus a force to be suppressed, and Nineteen Eighty-Four indeed illustrates how the protagonist’s nostalgia is disciplined by authority through torture sessions. The protagonist, Winston, is portrayed as an extremely ‘nostalgic’ person who, throughout the story, yearns for past memories and objects that must have existed before the reign of Big Brother. Assigned to rewrite historical documents in the Ministry of Truth and feeling disgusted by this act, which is beyond any ‘common sense’, Winston becomes obsessed with meditating over the past world and collecting antiques, although they are strictly forbidden. Nostalgia is here presented as a ‘political act’.35

However, it is questionable whether or not this actually qualifies as nostalgia. When Winston was first ushered into a room in a proletariat neighbourhood by antique seller, Charington, he was struck by an ambiguous yet poignant emotion, spurring him to take the risk to rent the room even though it is clearly a punishable act.

The room had awakened in him a sort of nostalgia, a sort of ancestral memory. It seemed to him that he knew exactly what it felt like to sit in a room like this, in an armchair beside an open fire with your feet in the fender and a kettle on the hob; utterly alone, utterly secure, with nobody watching you, no voice pursuing you, no sound except the singing of the kettle and the friendly ticking of the clock.36

It can be argued whether this is ‘a sort of nostalgia’ or a kind of mythmaking, which depends on whether or not the time for which Winston yearns is his actual lived past. His childhood memory is described as ‘half-forgotten’, and this seems to explain the use of the term ‘ancestral memory’.37 Orwell’s dystopia does not harness the possibility of hope explicitly; instead it ends up presenting a mythic closure.38 What is problematic in Winston’s longing for the past is his feeble memory of childhood and the state’s constant rewriting of history, which makes his memories even more fragile. Not knowing how to imagine a future, all that is left at the end is Winston’s despair. In a way, the novel thus risks rendering the story extremely sentimental in spite of its strongly political theme. Tom Moylan underscores this narrative contradiction: ‘while Orwell powerfully exposes the terror of official utopianism as he has come to see it, he also sets up a narrative structure that denies the possibility of an oppositional utopian resistance—be it in an organised formation, in individual actions such as those of Winston and Julia, or in the everyday lives of the Proles’.39 Winston’s psudo-nostalgia cannot avoid being criticised as escapist, since it is detached from his lived experience in the past as well as the present. Nineteen Eighty-Four seems to suggest that, when nostalgia is impossible, mythophilia takes its place. In other words, what Winston truly longs for is home, a place that is capable of providing an existential mooring for his life.

Meanwhile, in Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale, nostalgia is presented as a tool the protagonist, Offred, uses to examine the difference between the current dystopian theocratic society and the past liberal one, as well as to commemorate those whom she (presumably) lost—her husband,
daughter, mother, and friends. The story itself reads as a memoir of Offred’s losses. In order to tackle the decline of fertility and re-establish men’s domination over women, the Republic of Gilead coerced and enslaved women to be surrogate mothers; while ‘artificial insemination’ and ‘fertility clinics’ are considered as ‘irreligious’, the option of surrogating is deemed Biblically justifiable, which further illustrates the backward-looking nature of the state. Offred is one of the Handmaids forced to serve the Commander, and often feels compelled to reflect on her past life, which can be considered both as nostalgia and as a process of mourning the past. It should be stressed that Offred’s nostalgia is more nuanced than Winston’s, in that it carefully avoids idealising the past before the dystopia. This is possible since, unlike Winston’s, Offred’s own memories are still vivid. It is worth noting, however, that such nostalgia does not provide Offred easy comfort and often makes her feel inept. She continues to be haunted by her profound doubt concerning the possibility of a value judgement and the selective nature of memory, which is demonstrated in remarks such as ‘context is all’, ‘all of it is a reconstruction’, and ‘it’s my fault. I am forgetting too much’. Here, critical awareness provided by the sense of nostalgia is downgraded by Offred’s acute scepticism. The melancholic aspect of nostalgia seems thus overemphasised in The Handmaid’s Tale, rendering a moment of criticism futile.

On the other hand, unlike other dystopias, Gilead’s motivation for control is not to create a pseudo-utopia, but rather to enact pseudo-nostalgia amongst those who are in power, demanding to ‘return things to Nature’s norm’. This is another example where nostalgia can be conflated with myth-making; Gileadean philosophy mythologises the absolute patriarchal society by misusing the Bible, deeming it as ‘home’ for humanity. This is what Malpas calls ‘mythophilia’ as mentioned above, which ‘remains fixated on a past of which it has no memory of its own’. Gilead’s collective nostalgia is only an invention; it fabricates the loss of home and universalises it. Meanwhile, to enjoy the perverse pleasure of breaking the official rules, the Commander repeatedly orders Offred to engage in secret activities. Playing a game of Scrabble, allowing her to read old magazines and books, and procuring hand lotion for her—these are ways in which the Commander exercises his power over Offred. Offred is aware of the true motive behind his generosity: ‘[…] he was amusing himself, at my expense […] he must have known how painful it was to me, to be reminded of the former time’. While the Commander’s secret ‘gifts’ make Offred nostalgic, this nostalgia is carefully manipulated to serve the Commander’s desires. Later in the story, the Commander takes Offred to a secret dance club featuring women with make-up and scanty dresses and costumes, all of which are forbidden in Gilead. This place, prohibited yet created through official channels, serves to satisfy men’s feelings of nostalgia for the pre-Gilead era; the Commander indeed remarks that ‘[…] it’s like walking into the past’. In another situation, Offred observes the Commander’s tendency to wallow in his childhood memories: ‘[h]is laughter is nostalgic, […] the laughter of indulgence towards his former self’. Overall, while The Handmaid’s Tale reveals the problems with the notion of ‘critical nostalgia’ through Offred’s confused memoir; nostalgia is also presented as a trap; that is, as an effective device for oppression.

Lastly, Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go is the most explicitly nostalgic dystopian novel examined in this paper. Being set in the past (from 1960s to 1990s) rather than the future, Never Let Me Go presents the protagonist, Kathy’s, poignant yet controlled memoir of her thirty-one years. Kathy is one of the clones created for the purpose of organ harvesting; she recounts stories of
her past, not to provoke a change in society, but rather to be a ‘carer’ of ‘donors’, to help preserve their memories. Although she will soon be one of those donors and forced to ‘complete’, that is, to die, she can still tolerate such a fate if she at least has precious memories which are ‘safely in [her] head, and […] no one can take away’. In addition to Hailsham, her boarding school, various objects such as a cassette tape and an abandoned boat on the shore operate as key metaphors of lost childhood and cherished memories. Kathy stresses the permanent nature of her memories: ‘[t]he memories I value most, I don’t see them ever fading. I lost Ruth, then I lost Tommy, but I won’t lose my memories of them’. With regard to this, Yugin Teo argues that Kathy’s testimony ‘is their final act of resistance against the collective forgetting of those who wish to deny their existence’. Yet this interpretation of nostalgia as a means of survival appears to be somewhat simplistic. Memories themselves are not subversive; in order to make them so, Kathy would have to tell her stories to others. However, she never makes any attempt to share; her feelings of nostalgia seem rather to serve merely as a tranquilizer. The following remark by the principal of Hailsham is indeed ironic in this regard; ‘[y]ou see, we were able to give you something, something which even now no one will ever take from you […] we gave you your childhoods’. Here, memories are rationed as commodities.

The irony of Never Let Me Go is that it is a coming-of-an-age fiction, in which characters learn to accept their ‘role’ in society, that is, to conform to their servitude. Being nostalgic is not subversive or defeatist in itself; what is questionable in Ishiguro’s dystopia is rather the way Kathy is obsessed with the act of recollection. Throughout the story, she remains unaffected by Tommy and Lucy – her best friends who are more critical about their fate – even when confronting their deaths. In fact, memories seem to serve as ‘clones’ or substitutes for her friends and cherished objects, stripped of their individuality. Rather than searching for her true ‘home’ like other protagonists in dystopia, Kathy has already renounced such an attempt, filling her emptiness instead with instrumental memories. Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go thus depicts how an individual’s nostalgia turns into an act of myth-making; that is to say, Kathy renders her memories as two-dimensional, timeless images. This point is indeed highlighted by Norfolk, a mythical place depicted in the story, and believed to be ‘England’s “lost corner”, where all the lost property found in the country ended up’. In Kathy’s account, memories are considered as entities or possessions that provide her life with value, and thus, meaning. Kathy’s status as a commodified clone can therefore be defined as a metaphor of such instrumental modes of existence.

3. Conclusion

This paper demonstrates that reading dystopian fiction through the lens of nostalgia can illuminate a multi-faceted dimension of the relationship between critique and nostalgia. To achieve this, it is paramount to stick to the question of the fundamental nature of nostalgia – nostalgia as a phenomenon that resists binary (positive and negative) classification – so as not to diminish its conceptual horizons. The second part of this paper illustrates that nostalgia and mythmaking are conflated in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, while nostalgia turns into free-floating scepticism in Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale. In Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go, the protagonist pre-emptively utilises nostalgia as a way to accept her own servitude, rendering memories of her past instrumental in order to avoid any existential crisis. Meanwhile, dystopian novels provide
readers with the ultimate experience of being homeless in its extreme. With regard to this, Heidegger offers an interesting take on homesickness, stating that it is ‘not at all a yearning for something past, but rather a willing-forward into a new home’.54 As discussed above, the object of nostalgia has to be one’s lived home, not an imagined one. Whether deprived of it by authority or perhaps never having had it at all, what the protagonists in these dystopian novels attempt to find is a home. Moreover, is it possible to be nostalgic for ‘a new home’, for something in the future? Instead of dismissing dystopian novels as mythic and escapist, these are the questions that need to be asked in order to facilitate a new conceptualisation of time, home and longing.

University of Liverpool

Notes

4 Hofer, p. 381.
5 Ibid.
7 Ibid, p. 382.
8 Ibid.
9 This is the complaint that the current environment fails to accommodate one’s way of life; it could also be said that it is a failure of a patient to transfer/sublimate one’s attachments to the old home into something new.
10 This paper does not go into how nostalgia was gradually demedicalised and gained a common usage. For this, see Helmut Illbruck, Nostalgia: Origins and Ends of an Unenlightened Disease, Linda Austin, Nostalgia in Transition 1780–1917 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007).
12 Regarding this impossibility of coming home, Linda Hutcheon also points out its psychological implication: ‘nostalgia became less a physical than a psychological condition; in other words, it became psychically internalised. […] It also went from being a curable medical illness to an incurable (indeed unassuageable) condition of the spirit or psyche’. Linda Hutcheon, ‘Irony, Nostalgia, and the Postmodern’, in Methods for the Study of Literature in Cultural Memory, eds. by Raymond Vervliet and Annemarie Estor, (Atlanta: Rodopi, 2000), pp. 189–207 (p. 194).
14 Malpas, p. 162 (emphasis in original).
16 Ibid, p. 154 (emphasis in original).
19 Boym, p. 41; p. xviii.
20 Malpas, p. 170.
21 Ibid, p. 169.


Ibid, p. 185.

Boym, p. xv.

See also Illubruck, p. 22 for his criticism of Boym’s categorisation, in which he questions ‘the conception of the Enlightenment as a form of cure, liberating nostalgia from its Ovidian faith in the incommensurable and incommunicable secret of an actual, particular, and irreplaceable home, and also as choice between alternatives’.

Malpas, p. 166.


Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 175. ‘Factually, Dasein can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its moods; in certain possible ways of existing, this may signify a priority of volition and cognition’.


Orwell, p. 261.

Ibid, p. 133. This term is used for Winston’s sexual intercourse with Julia in the text.

Ibid, p. 100.

Ibid, p. 85.

As is often pointed out, there are implications in the text that the demise of Oceania sometime in the future (cf. the Appendix written in past tense).


For more extensive discussion on nostalgia in *The Handmaid’s Tale*, please see my article ‘I’m a refugee from the past: the Function of Nostalgia in *The Handmaid’s Tale*,’ *Sanglap: Journal of Literary and Cultural Inquiry* 2.1 (2015), 111–127.


Regarding this, Baccolini notes as follows in ‘Finding Utopia in Dystopia’: […] Winston’s dream of the Golden Country, an idealised past, fails to see the imperfections of that past and the connections between the seemingly “perfect past” and the dystopian present. Conversely, in a novel like Atwood’s *The Handmaid’s Tale*, nostalgia is recovered as the desire for what could have been (p. 176).


Ibid, p. 220.

Malpas, p. 170.

Atwood, p. 158.


Ibid, p. 186.


Ibid, p. 280. Also see the following quote: ‘[t]he memories I value most, I don’t ever see them fading’ (p. 280).


Ishiguro, p. 262.

Ibid, p. 65.


Works Cited


Teo, Yugin, *Kazuo Ishiguro and Memory* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)

